Public Choice Theory & Deadweight Social Loss
July 3rd, 2009http://shanklinmike.blogspot.com/
Public choice, also known as rent-seeking, can be defined as the application of economic theory and methodology to the study of politics and political institutions (DiLorenzo 59). The concept of rent seeking refers to legal or illegal activities to obtain special privilege such as seeking monopoly status, special zoning, quantitative restrictions on imports, protective tariffs, bribes, threats, and smuggling. Public choice theorists focus on how policy choices are shaped or constrained by incentives built into the routines of public and private organizations (Britannica). The debate between public monopolized, state-run production versus free enterprise, competitive private production has persisted for centuries with public choice theory serving as the battleground between the different perceived levels of efficiencies, or inefficiencies, inherent in both systems. Those that condemn laissez-faire capitalism vision it as an economic system built on greed in which the lower classes of society get left out. They correlate their voice in centralized coercive monopolies with a strong locus of control in their attempt to fix the system. They view greed as reserved to the people in the market place versus the persistent state-of-nature that encompasses all of humanity. Centralizers place faith in the bureaucrats and politicians, through central economic planning, to fix the problems that arise from capitalism, or at least what they believe is the fault of capitalism. They believe that a central authority alone should direct all production activities.
Pro-public sector champions rally behind a system that no longer allows the consumer, through their purchasing decisions or non-purchasing decisions, to determine what should be produced, and in what quantity and quality (Von Mises 4). Free market laissez-faire capitalism focuses on property rights protection where consumers, through their freely determined choices, are able to determine the goods and services demanded in the economy through no cognitive process of their own. It’s based around private ownership in a competing market where barriers to entry in an industry are low to none and where government is refrained to a negative role, that is, a role where they determine justice and restitution as well as protecting against fraud, force, or theft.
Those that are not for complete state control but not for full free markets are ‘middle-of-the-road’ voters, also known as interventionists (Von Mises 4). This mixed economic system tries to combine the positives of both free market systems and socialist systems while minimizing the negatives of each. With this mixed economy arises a conflict due to the fact that it does not allow for any compromise, control is indivisible. Either the consumers’ demand as manifested on the market decides for what purposes and how the factors of production should be employed, or the government takes care of these matters. There is nothing that could mitigate the opposition between these two contradictory principles, they preclude each other (Von Mises 4).
The career politician in a democratic society makes a living by winning elections. When considering all the factors that go into individual behavioral patterns, most people assume that the politician acts in a self-interested way. After all, he or she is trying to win an election for themselves, regardless of the cause. With hindsight, most people can rightfully assume that personal gain is a part of the job (Tullock 7). Regardless of external personal incentives, no politician or bureaucrat has perfect information, just like no individual market participant has perfect information. One stark difference between the private and public systems of production is that private production, in a free market, sends signs of growth or decline in a certain industry through price signals which can help lead to a more efficient allocation of resources with a scarcity benchmark. This spontaneous order through voluntary exchange in a market economy helps set equilibrium wages, prices, and costs without the force of government. When profits increase, that is a signal that more production is required in that industry and vice versa when profits decrease.
In central planned economies, production is not based upon the consumer’s wants or needs, it is focused on bureaucratic goals such as employment or price setting negative externalities. This lack of consumer equilibrium heavily distorts market signals such as profit and price, making it much harder for the central planners to gather information, let alone perfect information. Public choice analysts have developed many insights into the economic motives of politicians and economic consequences of their political power such as through laws, rules, regulations, taxes, and changes to direct or influence individual lives (Tullock 129). “People are people,” subject to the same motivation in public-life as in their private-life. This economic view of human motivation contrasts with the flawed view of political science that presents human beings as behaving very differently. Political scientists and sociologists view politicians as acting selflessly in public life and selfishly in private life (Tullock 129). The question then arises, where do the politicians get the money to do all these selfless acts?
In much of public-choice theory, interest groups are viewed as entities that coalesce to express a demand for wealth transfers. In seeking political profit, politicians respond by supplying the transfers through legislation and regulation. Thus, just as a perfectly competitive, profit-maximizing firm would cater to consumer demands, politicians passively respond to the wishes of interest groups. But the price theory analogy is not entirely accurate, for in a world of uncertainty, producers are constantly searching for and creating profit opportunities by advertising, offering new or different products, and other activities aimed at stimulating the demand for their goods or services. They do not merely respond to changing consumer demands. Similarly, political entrepreneurs do not just passively respond to interest-group pressures; they also try to stimulate the demand for their perceived services (DiLorenzo 62).
Many times, those who support these groups have little idea what they are stating until further translated. They fail to see the further implications that will arise from current policy. When they say that the way to national wealth is to pay out governmental subsidies, they are in effect saying that the way to national wealth is to increase taxes. When they say that the way to recovery is to increase wage rates, they have found only another way of saying that the way to recovery is to increase costs of production (Hazlitt). Many times, policies are not considered and lobbyists with the biggest clout can pressure a candidate to sign-on in addition to donations and future voters. Bureaucracies have strong incentives to promote and stimulate a perceived need for their activities—every bureaucracy is a vigorous lobbyist (DiLorenzo 60). In 1984, the Department of Agriculture hired 144 full time lobbyists with a budget of over $6.5 million, now the DOA employs over 700 lobbyists to help gain support in Congress and the grassroots (DiLorenzo 62). These bureaucracies continue to grow in scope and the system of growth perpetuates itself. More money means you can hire more lobbyists and advertisers who can then recruit more people which will drive in more money which will hire more lobbyists, and the cycle continues. It is important to remember that this process is not creating new wealth, only spending current wealth while decreasing capital accumulation which leads to future economic growth.
Every year hundreds of millions of dollars are spent subsidizing special interest groups such as consumer groups, environmentalists, welfare rights lobbyists, civil rights organizations, labor unions, senior citizen organizations (DiLorenzo 63). Subsidies also extend to agriculture, ethanol, military industrial complex, the medical industrial complex, obesity programs, NASA lobbyists, FEMA, DHS, and various other governmental alphabet soup programs. It is once again important to remember that none of these programs create efficient long-run sustainable products. That being true, most of these functions would be defunded by the people if the threat and coercive force of government power from taxation had been lifted but only if the marginal social benefit value is less than the input.
Very few people are educated on true individualism, and there is a logical explanation. In the public realm, a voter’s ballot is only 1 out of 60 million, at least on a National level. The vote has practically no weight politically and each voter understands that little time and effort is needed to qualify to vote. Many voters feel there time is wasted spent researching as they feel they cannot make a difference. Conversely, politicians will select policies that attract voters knowing that voters put much less time into researching theories such as the Paradox of Thrift, the Laffer Curve, and equilibrium wage rates then they would if they were out purchasing a new car (Tullock 27).
Ludwig von Mises believed that interventionism such as price controls are all a part of the public choice cycle that inevitably leads to socialism. When government tries to lower prices on commodities such as milk so that it is more available to the poor, it has done nothing more than create a price ceiling which sets the price of milk at a price lower than that of the efficient free market equilibrium. Milk producers, especially marginal producers with high fixed costs, will now be operating at a loss and must close down leading to deadweight social loss. Maybe some of these producers will go into the cheese or butter industry where profits signal for investment but for now all that matters is that the government, by trying to increase milk intake to the poor, has actually created a reduction of overall milk in the economy while placing a once efficient producer out of business or sent overseas (Von Mises 7).
The cycle is rewarded when voters who supported this policy re-elect the same person to ‘contribute’ next term. There are incentives from every side, from the voters on specific issues, to the politicians who adopt anti-liberty positions to appease voters, to the bureaucracies that are rewarded for failure (at least coming from a true individualism perspective). It is now at this crucial point that government can either step back, admit its mistakes about reducing milk production while deviating price signals in the market or it can try to fix the problems that were created by this fluctuation of prices. The government, knowing it is political suicide to admit fault and take responsibility, must chase all other affected consumer goods with new policies, create new policies to stabilize wages that were affected along with complementary materials. No branch of industry is exempt outside of the bureaucracies and if a couple luxury or non-vital goods were left out capital would flow into them resulting in a drop in the supply of the vital commodities, the exact prices government fixed precisely because they were viewed as indispensable for the satisfaction of the needs of the masses (Von Mises 8).
We have now witnessed a politician taking his majority policy incentive, the short-run supporters of the bill who stand to profit off it, the bureaucracies that helped push the legislation through, and the negative externalities on the rest of the market as a result of the flow of capital out of milk investment due to the inability for to competitors to make a profit. Why invest in something that is a losing cause? Quantity is lost forever, or at least until the price ceiling is removed when equilibrium market pressures decrease long-run expected output. As government tries to correct its mistakes, it often makes them much worse.
Government intervention created the Great Depression through the Federal Reserve’s Boom and Bust policies that saw inflation and a contraction of the money supply. Had the government truly wanted to see an end to the depression the best course of action would have been inactivity by the bureaucrats. Instead, Hoover and FDR both interfered with the market adjustment process creating more government negative externalities that would need more time for the mal-investment to drain. (Rothbard 19). Rothbard listed six government actions that would delay the adjustment process. First was the prevention or delay of liquidation. This could come in the form of lending money to shaky businesses while calling on banks to lend further. The second government action to extend a depression is to inflate further. Further inflation blocks the necessary fall in prices, thus delaying adjustment and prolonging depression. Further credit expansion creates more mal-investments, which, in their turn, will have to be liquidated in some later depression.
A government “easy money” policy prevents the market’s return to the necessary higher interest rates. The third way for government action to extend a depression is to keep wage rates up. Artificial maintenance of wage rates in a depression insures permanent mass unemployment. Furthermore, in deflation, when prices are falling, keeping the same rate of money wages means that real wage rates have been pushed higher. In the face of falling business demand, this greatly aggravates the unemployment problem. The fourth way for government intervention to extend a depression is to keep prices up. Keeping prices above their free-market levels will create unsalable surpluses, and prevent a return to prosperity.
The fifth way for government interventionism to extend a depression is to stimulate consumption and discourage savings. We have seen that more saving and less consumption would speed recovery; more consumption and less saving aggravate the shortage of saved capital even further. Government can encourage consumption by “food stamp plans” and relief payments. It can discourage savings and investment by higher taxes, particularly on the wealthy and on corporations and estates. As a matter of fact, any increase of taxes and government spending will discourage saving and investment and stimulate consumption, since government spending is all consumption. Some of the private funds would have been saved and invested; all of the government funds are consumed. Any increase in the relative size of government in the economy, therefore, shifts the societal consumption–investment ratio in favor of consumption, and prolongs the depression. The last way Rothbard mentions in which government interventionism could prolong a depression is to subsidize unemployment. Any subsidization of unemployment will prolong unemployment indefinitely, and delay the shift of workers to the fields where jobs are available (Rothbard 20). Government jobs that are subsidized are usually less efficient than the private sector resulting in inefficient production for employment as well as a delay in real employment creation. Rothbard’s work focuses around the bad policy decisions pursued by government and the Federal Reserve helping us prove that perfect information is not available to the central planners, even after decades of attempts.
Many public choice scholars do not think that government is systematically engaged in maximizing the public interest, but they assume that government officials are attempting to maximize their own private interests (Tullock). In the market, institutions, through maximizing their own interests, at least to some extent provide goods and services for other people as a byproduct. In government bureaucracies, although there is a byproduct put off by any action, they usually do not have the same amount of social marginal benefit as a competitive equilibrium market could supply. Looking at the automobile industry and agricultural industry, it is easy to see why these producers would want tariffs and quotas on imported goods and services (their competitors).
The group is small in number and the cost of the import protectionist effort is small when spanned out across millions of customers who don’t understand the price of the car already includes these hidden government fees. Although free trade could lead to long-run efficiency and end the war on consumerism, the interest groups must continue to raise the price to satisfy his or her constituent (Tullock 87). Tullock states, “Once protectionist measures are established by government, they assume a life of their own.” Once these policies are put into effect, special interests will move in to secure their special privileges. The rent seeking element of protection explains the activities of special interests seeking benefits at the expense of the general public.
Logrolling, also known as vote trading, takes place when opponents combine bills together to vote for both at the same time. If the republicans want intervention A,B,C and the democrats want intervention 1,2,3, then together they can vote for their big programs and both of them will have passed. This case scenario is bad for true individualists who would more likely than not want see an expansion of liberty ideals. Logrolling is illegal in some areas and can lead to social losses. The United States used to have a tariff on import chin rests for violins to protect the producers here at home. The only makers of the small chin rest had only 4 or 5 employees. Because the costs equated to only a few cents per customer, nobody showed up to Congress to defend the people against this tariff. The investment paid off for the producer as they not only created a tax that is hidden for the bureaucracies special interest groups but also helped monopolize their product.
The same could be said about other types of interventionism into the market. Minimum wage rates help reinforce mass unemployment for years down the road, regardless if done by labor union force or government (Von Mises 9). The booms and busts of the business cycle have created not only huge recessions but also the Great Depression through credit expansion while most of the voting public remains clueless to the true cause of our bubbles. Day after day, we hear of government policies that have brought us more inefficiency because prices are not fixed to supply and demand. In the market, when people want more of an item, they offer more for it. As the price goes up, profits increase as well. This new incentive structure makes the industry more profitable sending more investors into that field. Economic expansion can now happen where additional jobs are opened up due to the increase in owner’s equity or capital. Competing firms take what price the market gives them since in a competitive market, industries are price takers, not price setters. This increase in supply lowers the price and reduces the profit margin up until profit margin is equal to the general profit levels (Hazlitt 106). This helps conclude that prices are determined by costs of production, or does it? Prices are actually determined by supply and demand, not cost of production. The cost of creating something yesterday cannot determine its value today, prices must be set on supply and demand in a market economy
Rent-seeking and public choice theory can help open the eyes of many people who do not understand the economic and political system that they live under. Rent-seeking, a nonproductive activity, has numerous negative externalities that can send shock waves through the economy, especially when politicians and bureaucrats take counteractive measures for their previous mistakes. The battle between capitalism, a competitive/free enterprise system, and socialism, centralized bureaucratic monopolies, relates directly to public choice theory and understanding the lobbyist groups and special interests that pull the greatest clout. Interventionism, the transition from capitalism to socialism, according to Mises, is an ongoing state of nature that has yet to be stopped by reason. Protectionism, tariffs, barriers, price setting, subsidies and other various forms of rent-seeking only perpetuate the cycle of bureaucracy growth in a cycle of political advertisement, reward for failure, and growth.
Education is what is needed to overcome the poor practices of public choice theory. Compared to federalism and capitalism, socialism oligopolizes all production at a national level where bureaucrats are uneducated on all topics and often don’t realize the war on consumerism they support in the short-run. Government’s often do too much and don’t allow the adjustment period to take full effect, calling for more action, often for political gain. Who controls these bureaucracies is what determines the outcome for each session. It is not that many of the politicians are bad people and they like enacting plans that lead to social deadweight loss, many just don’t understand economics or public choice theory. Those that condemn laissez-faire capitalism are confusing slavery for freedom.
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